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THE ENFORCEMENT OF
CONFORMITY TO LAW
THROUGH CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
C. GAYLORD WATKINS-::

Contempt may best be defined as "an act of disobedience or
disrespect toward a judicial or legislative body of government or
interference with its orderly process for which a summary punishment is usually exacted".' The contempt power, though technically
an enforcement device of remedial and coercive character, has always
received much publicity. By the very nature of the power's arbitrary
and speedy operation and the areas of its application it continually
emerges as a "volatile, focal point of significant and timely political
issues". 2 We see this today in the recent Canadian labour injunction
disputes. 3 We witnessed this not so long ago in the American congressional investigations into subversion and communism. We are
aware of contempt proceedings as the control mechanism of the press,
especially in the conflict between the freedom of the press and the
individual's right to a fair, unbiased trial. Not so apparent and not
so easily rationalized is the civil contempt power, coercive in aim
and used to enforce civil decrees and judgments.
The contempt power in Canada is exercisable not only in the
traditional realms of the Court and legislative bodies, but, as well,
through statutory mandate by certain administrative tribunals, investigatory organs and commissions.
Historical Background
Contempt is an inherited power which, like many of the devices
of the common law, developed applications in the hereditary process
seemingly incompatible with its original form. Born in the days of
kingly rule and well suited to early English rulers and their style of
government, contempt was an obvious and effective means of assuring
C. Gaylord Watkins, B.Sc. (McGill), is a member of the 1967 graduating
class of Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 GOLDPAR, THE CONTEMP POWER (1963) at 1.
2 Id, at 5.
3 Discussed infra at note 100 and following.
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the dignity of and respect for the governing sovereign. Although a
product of Anglo-Canadian-American legal doctrine, references to
certain judicial punishing powers which looked like contempt (and
that were conceded to be a necessary means of official force) are to be
4
found in the writings of Justinian and in the Codes of Canon Law.
Other early law-makers concluded that contempt of a governmental
authority should not be punishable, apparently recognizing that
respect by compulsion is a contradiction in terms, and no means to
a free, libertarian government. 5
As society grew, the use of bare force alone to enforce obedience
and respect proved inadequate. The initial rationalization of an effective power device within a rule-of-law scheme was found in the divine
right of kings. Disobedience to the monarch by his subjects then was
automatically sinful; respect for divinity and in its aura, the mantle
of divinity resulted in obedience to the commands of the sovereign
ruler. The contempt power, with this basis, developed and enlarged
in scope, aided greatly by adoption and cultivation by men never
adverse to expanding their own influence through its exercise.
Realistically, later institutions accepted the contempt power more to
protect their own dignity and supremacy than because of their relationship to the king.
Eventually, the king discovered that by having agents act for
him, the weight and worry of governing greatly decreased. The courts,
as agents of the king, derived their use of the contempt power in
such cases from the presumed contempt of the king's authority.6 In
similar fashion, equity courts held that disobedience or obstruction of
their orders and judgments issued under the King's seal, was contempt of the King and punishable as such. The right to punish disobedience, obstruction or disrespect thus was treated as an inherent
power in the courts themselves, arising from the nature of their
relationship with the King.
Rooted in Norman legal practices, the early civil contempt
offender was imprisoned until he purged his act of contempt by
carrying out the order of the court. The criminal contemnor was liable
unconditionally to fine or imprisonment or both. However, in all early
cases, contempt was treated procedurally in the ordinary course of
the law.7 Summary punishment ensued only if the accused person
confessed his guilt. Sir John Fox, the most noted scholar on the history
of contempt, has discovered that numerous contempts up to the 15th
century were treated as ordinary offences and not dealt with by
summary process, as would have been the case in the 18th century. 8
4 Canon 1840, tit. 3, bk. 4; Canon 1842, tit. 9. See GOLDFARB, supra note
1 at 10.
5 Supra note 1 at 10: The Theodosian Code; PATTERSON, ON LIBERTY OF
SPEECH AND PRESS (1939) at 18.

6 Beale, Contempt of Court; CriminaZ and Civil, (1908), 21 HARv. L. Rv.

161.

7 Supra note 1 at 16; Fox, The Summary Process to Punish Contempt,

(1909) 25 L.Q. Rev. 238, at 241.
8 Fox, CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927) at 10.
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The Star Chamber, not surprisingly, first allowed the exercise of
summary process where it was deemed appropriate because of the
immediacy and physical relationship of the contemnor's act to the
court. If justice, in these situations, was not immediate, the courts
felt that they could not perform their sacred duty of administering
justice. Necessity, then, was introduced at that time as an explanation
for punishing contempts in facie curiae outside the ordinary course of
the law.
Not until Blackstone and other subsequent 18th century writers
do we find contempt being summarily punished without regard to
the locale of commission. What is now considered to be the basis
for such an extension arose from the judgment of Mr. Wilmot in
Rex v. Almon.9 Sir John Eardley-Wilmot, appointed in 1765 to try
Almon, a bookseller, for publishing an alleged libel of Lord Mansfield,
held that contempts of court, both direct and indirect, in and out of
court, were from time immemorial punishable summarily, as well as
by indictment and criminal information. This wide summary power
was described as being "coeval with the first foundation and institution" of English courts. 10 Due to a procedural defect, Mr. Justice
Wilmot's opinion was not delivered, and thus never became a valid
legal precedent. Historical analysis, as previously mentioned, has
indicated that contempts outside the court, prior to Rex v. Almon,
had always been tried by regular methods of trial procedure." Furthermore, it appears that in all probability, Blackstone merely adopted
the views of Mr. Justice Wilmot.' 2 It may thus be concluded that
"the present scope of the summary power is due almost exclusively
to the opinion of one man".' 3 Rex v. Almon has been accepted and
extended by an unbroken line of English, American and Canadian
cases. As well, the Criminal Code of Canada has impliedly sanctioned
this use of the summary power by providing an appeal from conviction and sentence in the case of all contempts of court not committed
in facie curiae.14 The courts, while asserting that the contempt power,
in its present form, has never been abused, have recognized the
potentiality for its abuse. Many dicta may be found stressing that this
extraordinary power is to be used only when the contempt is clearly
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' 5 The contempt power was thus
born narrow but grew with time and enthusiastic proponents to its
present, much broader form. It is now a right in the courts so well
rooted in judicial practice that only precise legislative enactment
can remove it.
Contempt of parliament arose as well in the days of the divine
rule of kings. Since parliament was originally a council representing
9 (1765) Wilmot's Notes 243; 97 E.R. 44.
10 Id., Wilmot's Notes, at 254.
11 Supra note 8 at 8-9.
12
13
14
15

Supra note 1 at 10; THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT 0F COURT, (1934).
Id., at 5 (THOMAS).
Section 9(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada.
R. v. Payne, (1896) 1 Q.B. 577 at 580 (Lord Russell. C.J.); Ziegal,

Some Aspects of the Law of Contempt of Court in Canada,England and the
United States, (1960) 6 McGILL L.J. 229.
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the judicial authority of the king, rendering judgments and enacting
law, it naturally adopted the contempt power as a necessary and
inherent accessory to its court-like function.' 6 Whether the adoption
resulted from Parliament's ensuring its position by the exercise of
privileges and procedures deemed befitting of its past
or because
7
of its original judicial capacity, is a point of conjecture.'
In any event, what was inherent to the courts also became inherent to the legislature-the House of Commons. However, a modern
trend toward restraint in the use of contempt power by Parliament
is evidenced by the English cases since the latter part of the 19th
8
century.'
An important factor affecting the number of situations in which
contempt of Parliament is applicable is the government's approach
to fact-finding investigations. American investigations are traditionally held by congressional committees within the political arena.
These committees by invoking the assistance of the courts wield the
contempt of Congress power (with which they are inherently vested)
more as a weapon against individuals than as a shield of the government. 9 Commonwealth jurisdictions conduct such investigations not
by their legislatures but through Royal Commissions and tribunals
of inquiry, which are instruments of the Executive. Even though
the contempt power has been normally granted to these investigatory
bodies, they have generally functioned in an efficient manner without
20
its direct assistance.
In Canada, contempt of Parliament exists as an invasion of the
rights of the legislature as a whole, from disobedience to its orders,
or disorderly conduct before or within it. Scandalous or libellous
reflections in the proceedings or on the members in their capacity as
members by persons outside Parliament are treated as contempts of
Parliament. The contemnor may be summoned to appear before the
Bar of the House of Commons to explain or to justify these acts.
Punishment may be by public reprimand, delivered by the Speaker,
or by imprisonment while the House is in session. 21 Although some
authorities 22 consider that the power of commitment is fundamental
Supra note I at 25.
Potts, The Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, (1926)
74 U. PA. L. Rav. 691.
18 Supra note 1 at 27-29.
19 Id., at 45: Goldfarb notes the great and recent increase in the number
of witnesses cited for contempt of Congress in the United States. From 1857
to 1949 there were 113 citations, while from 1950 to 1952 there were 117!
20 Royal Commissions and Inquiries originated by the Federal Government or the Government of Ontario have usually been granted the contempt
power by virtue of the Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1952 c. 154 or the Public Inquiries
Act, R.S.O. 1960 c. 323. The power has been rarely used. Discussion infra at
note 68.
16
17

21 DAwso,

Tu GOVERNMNT OF CANADA, (1963) at 372, 373. See generally,

Fischer, Hugo, Civil and Criminal Aspects of Contempt of Court, (1956) 34
CAN. BAR RaV. 121, at 132. The House may recommit the contemnor to gaol
for further punishment at the beginning of the next session.
22 Ward, Called to the Bar of the House of Commons, (1957) 35 CAN.
BAR RaV. 529.
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to parliamentary privilege, it is now fifty years since it was last
used. As a device for enforcing conformity to law it cannot be considered as presently relevant in Canada.2 3
Classification by the Courts of the Contempt Power
"Contempt is the Proteus of the legal world, assuming an almost
infinite variety of forms.24 It has been categorized, sub-classified and
scholastically dignified into varying shades, each covering some particular aspect of the general power, respectively governed by a particular set of procedures. '25 Legal texts distinguish retributive or
criminal contempts from coercive or civil contempts, and those contempts which are directly offensive to the courts from those only
constructively contemptuous. Though these are the most prevalent
divisions of the contempt power, there are many other classifications.
Lord Hardwicke saw contempt as a three-fold creature: "One kind
of contempt is scandalizing the court itself. There may also be a
contempt of this court in abusing parties who are concerned in cases
here. There may also be contempt of this court in prejudicing mankind
against persons before the case is heard". 26
What is significant about the characterization of the variety of
contempt present is that this determination defines the treatment of
the contempt that follows: Once classified, specific procedures and
limitations come into operation which directly affect the contenmor's
liberty and property rights. For example, direct contempts are dealt
with summarily 27 while indirect contempts demand some hearing.28
Criminal contempts, though pardonable, cannot be purged, the exact
opposite being the case for civil contempts. The court may fine or
imprison the criminal contemnor for a definite period, while the
civil contemnor faces the possibility of an incarceration, conceivably
without end, with even the order for discharge being made conditional
on payment of costs. As would be expected, the burden of proof for
criminal contempts is greater than for civil contempts. Even the rules
for appeal differ, although in Canada, it is only since 1955 that
criminal contempts have been appealable. 29 It is interesting to note
23 Contempt has also been traditionally used as a means of disciplining
solicitors, as officers of the court. See Fischer, supra note 21 at 146, in particular at 147: "[Tlhe court, will, if necessary, use its contempt powers
wherever a solicitor neglects to pay out money or hand over papers held by
him without lawful excuse or moneys received for charges improperly made."
Fischer discusses (at 148) those instances where certain persons and their
property are protected from contempt proceedings (e.g., heads of state have a
complete privilege or immunity, while members of Parliament are protected
from civil contempt proceedings while the House is in session).
24 Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Criminal and Civil, (1943) COLTmi.
L. REV. Vol. 43 780.
25 Supra note 1 at 1.
26 St. James Evening Post, [1742) 2 Atk. 471.
27 Be Duncan, [1954] S.C.R. 41.
28 Hdbert, [1966) B.R. (P.Q.Q.B.) 197.
29 Section 9 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 5:125

that there is apparently no privilege from arrest3 0for solicitors and
members of Parliament in criminal contempt cases.
The comment of Oliver Wendall Holmes that "the substance of
the law is secreted in the interstices of procedure" aptly describes the
situation. Only by examining the process conveying the contemnor
to his punishment may we discover whether the offence is civil or
criminal in nature, of private or public significance and concern.
Originally, classification was not considered a problem. Contempts
were purely criminal and directed at offensive conduct amounting to
active interference with the Crown or its official agents in the course
of their duties. Civil contempt was a contempt in procedure and
primarily an equitable device used to secure obedience to court
orders.31 The power of the equity courts to imprison in aid of civil
process did accentuate the similarity of civil and criminal contempts
which were already so alike in nature and name. Yet there has never
been a simple body of law on contempt. Instead there existed a
criminal contempt law and a distinct procedural device which looked
like contempt, went by the same name, but was not really the same
creature. The passage of time has, however, brought all contempts
into one family, though somewhat beset by domestic strife. The
criminal stigma attached to one member of the family cannot help
but infect others in the same domestic setting who have had no
direct involvement with anything defined as criminal.
Writers on contempt have attempted repeatedly to distinguish
every act of contempt in terms of its civil or criminal nature. Rapalje
realistically termed the task impossible, concluding "that the main
distinction between the two consisted in the passive non-compliance
between private parties typical of civil contempts as contrasted with
the positive obstruction or active disrespect to the court which
characterizes criminal contempts".3 2 Oswald basically agreed but
placed more stress on the object of the contemptuous act, that is,
whether it would result in a private injury, or whether by a deliberate
and active interference with the law its consequence was a public
offence. The result of the contemptuous act thus evidently determines,
33
in the final analysis, its characterization as civil or criminal. However, to distinguish between the two classes of contempt we must
determine the purpose of the punishment. "If it is for civil contempt
the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant.
the sentence is punitive, to vindicate
But if it is for criminal contempt
34
the authority of the court."
Because all contempts do tend to interfere with the due course
of justice, civil contempts cannot help attracting a varying number
30 According to the Canadian Encyclopedic Digest, parliamentary privilege
gives no protection for criminal contempts though it would bar attachment
for a civil contempt: Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort, (1831) 39 E.R. 538.
31 HALSBURY, 2nd Ed., Vol. 7, Contempt of Court.
32 RAPALsE, A TREATISE oN CONTEMPT, (1884) at 25.
33 OSWALD, CONTEMPT OF COURT, (1911).
34 See Fischer, supra note 21 at 139 where

Stove & Range Co., (1911) 221 U.S. 418 at 441.

he quotes Gompers v. Buck's
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of criminal contempt characteristics. This overlapping leads to confusion in determining whether the contemnor's conduct interferes
with the law or administration of justice in general or whether it is
merely an interference with the rights, judicially determined, of a
private party.3 5 The individual is thus unable to foresee the consequences of his future acts. This situation represents a violation of
the principle of criminal law that the consequences of 3all
acts be
6
clearly stated in order to forewarn all potential violators.
As has been indicated previously, direct contempts were originally punished summarily while contempts committed outside the court,
that is, indirect contempts, were punishable in the ordinary procedural manner. Rex v. Almon 37 expanded the initial summary punishment situation to include contempts committed by strangers outside
of the court. Generally, "spontaneous, aggressive conduct, expressly
aimed at the court itself or the parties to the action, which tended
physically to obstruct the administration of justice" has delineated
direct contempt (in facie curiae or so close thereto as to be physically
disturbing); while constructive or indirect contempt has been
categorized as "acts of misconduct apart from the immediate proceedings in time or location, which by
implication tended to interfere
38
with the administration of justice".
In the direct contempt situation, the court reasons that since it
has personal knowledge of the act of contempt, any requirement of
formal proof would be superfluous. The court need not prove what
it already knows and may thus punish the contemnor forthwith.
Although indirect or constructive contempts may be punished summarily they do require more of a hearing than that given to direct
contempts. 39 Where there is a sensory awareness of the contempt, the
court's power to punish summarily without hearing is more easily
rationalized. However, that power has been extended to cases when
the contempt so causally affects the administration of justice as to
have a clear and obvious impact on it.40
Direct contempts have included: insulting protests against the
judgments of a court; assault or battery near a courtroom; threatening witnesses near the courtroom, blaspheming the judge, openly insulting a presiding judge, resistance to orders of the court in its
presence, acts the court personally knows of or which take place in
such a way as to impede proceedings, and disorderly conduct or
insulting demeanor.4' Indirect contempts have been found preDiscussed infra.
In fact, as Fischer points out, since Poje, infra note 98, it is patently
obvious that identical behaviour may be classified as both civil, and criminal
contempt, depending on the person of the contemnor, or the purpose of the
classification. See Fischer, supra note 21 at 161 and 126-130. Commentators,
as well as judges, find the law of contempt shrouded in obscurity. Fischer
at 162, n. 265.
37 97 E.R. 44.
38 Supra note I at 1, 2.
39 I-Ibert, supra note 28.
40 Supra note 1 at 21, and for the U.S. position, 70.
41 RAPALSE, OswALD, and HALSBURy: supra notes 31, 32, and 33.
35
36
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dominantly in contempts by publication (unless there is a clear and
obvious impact upon the court) but have resulted as well from
preventing the service of process, improper communications to or by
jurors, withholding evidence from the jurisdiction of the court, and
bribing witnesses or jurors.42
The major use of the constructive contempt power has been
against contempts arising from press publications. These contempts
are acts of criticism, pressure, or interference with trials and their
participants, which by implication injuriously affect the administration of justice. Blackstone considered that such acts did disrupt the
good order of the kingdom 43 and the courts have willingly agreed.
However, actual injuries in such cases are seldom clearly connectible
to the allegedly contemptuous act, and thus are really speculative
in nature.
Rex v. Almon was the first recorded instance when the courts
would have punished an individual for critical words written about
a member of the judiciary and concerning a court proceeding. That
case, it must be remembered, indicated what Mr. Justice Wilmot
thought the law should be rather than what the law was at that time.
The case, however, has been religiously followed so that the law of
constructive contempt may now be brought to bear on the publication
of information which might later have been ruled inadmissible at 45
a
trial,44 allegories on the general imposition of the death penalty, 46
matters written before a case came to court and after a trial ended,
personal criticism of judges, 47 material written without knowledge
of the judicial process of which it was in contempt, 48 and many
others. It is in the exercise of the constructive contempt sanction
that contempt has its broadest application.
Having surveyed the background and scope of the contempt
power, it is now relevant to examine its usage by the Canadian courts.
It should then be possible to appraise the power's effectiveness as a
means of producing obedience to law, assess its various rationalizations, and finally judge the power's compatibility with the ideals,
rights, and freedoms of common law jurisdictions and of legal systems
productive of good order and justice, generally.
The Direct Contempt Power
Summary treatment of direct contempt of court would appear
to be a necessary means of maintaining order within the courts.
Ordered procedures of trial and hearing are obviously essential to an
impartial and effective administration of justice. Such utilization of
the contempt sanction does not directly produce conformity to law,
42

Supra note 1 at 21, 70.

43 BLAcCKsToNE CoMmNTARmEs, at 285.
44 R. v. Clarke (1910) 27 T.L.R. 32 (K.B.).

45
46
47
48

Re Nichol, [1954] 3 D.L.R. 690.
King v. Davies, [1906] 1 K.B. 22.
R. v. Editor of the New Statesman, 44 T.L.R. 301.
R. v. Odham's Press, [19571 1 Q.B. 73, infra note 128.
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but rather a suitable atmosphere in which the relevant law may be
determined and applied. What is first required is an acceptance of
the mechanism by which the administrative and judicial process
attempts to formulate a just solution for the particular case.
Acquiescence to the formal procedure leading to the judicial determination of which party must obey which law is thus an essential
pre-requisite of obedience and confirmity to law itself. A valid exercising of the contempt power must indicate the presence of a real impediment to or interference with the course of justice.
Direct contempts are predominately criminal in nature and effect.
A respected Canadian judge has listed what he considers to be some
of the more obvious direct contempts: "demonstrations in the court
room by shouting and noisy behaviour; applauding a verdict, or jury,
or decision of a judge; refusing to give evidence when properly subpoened as a witness, or to answer relevant questions; refusing to leave
the court room when ordered to do so, or to obey the orders of a court
or its officers with respect to a trial which is in progress, whether
civil or criminal;or using abusive or disrespectful language to a judge
presiding at the trial." 49 It is seen then that conduct in the face of the
court manifesting disrespect, of any form, for the judicial process
or the judiciary has been considered sufficiently obstructive to the
administration of justice (and to the public interest) to merit summary punishment. Direct contempts are penalized as contumacious
behaviour, 50 although in certain cases (refusal of witnesses to testify),
a coercive type of penalty is present.
The power to discipline contempts committed in the face of the
court outside the ordinary course of justice is possessed by every
court of record. 51 It has been held to be an inherent right and necessary incident of all courts, and with respect to superior courts of
justice, is not abrogated by any statutory enactment. 52 Only superior
courts have the power to punish summarily for contempts ex facie
curiae. Justices of the Peace, and Masters have only the power to
order the removal of persons interfering with the orderly conduct of
business before them. It has been held that a magistrate does not
have the power to commit for contempts in facie curiae during a
hearing on a summary conviction matter.53 Section 426 of the Criminal
Code does though give "every judge and magistrate the same power
and authority to preserve order in a court over which he presides
as may be exercised by the Superior Court of Criminal Jurisdiction
of the province." A magistrate has been allowed under his general
power to preserve order to summarily punish a direct contempt in a
preliminary hearing where the accused refused to rise when the court
was called to order.54 Magistrates may also apparently initiate con49

McRuer, C.J.H.C. of Ontario (as he then was), Contempt of Court

Procedure (1952) 30 CAw. BAR REV. 225.

50 Lougheed v. Thompson and MacDonald (1928) 36 O.W.N. 84, 139.
51
52
53
54

In re Gerson; In re Nightingale, [1946) S.C.R. 547.
Ex parte Lunan, [1951] O.R. 257.
Re Harry Rose, [1964] C.C.C. 25 (Ont.).
R. v. Hume; ex parte Hawkins, (1966) 53 D.L.R. (2d) 453 (B.C.S.C.)
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tempt proceedings by way of information, or by citing the alleged
contemnor to show cause why he should not be committed. 55
Certain direct and "procedural" contempts are punishable by
statutory authority.56 The failure of a witness to appear, without
lawful excuse, may result in a summary punishment of up to $100
fine, or 90 days in jail, or both.5 7 Refusal to testify at a preliminary
hearing is punishable by an immediate imprisonment for a period
days-a penalty which may be repeated for
not exceeding eight
58
further refusals.
Since 1955, where a court, judge, justice or magistrate summarily
convicts a person for a contempt of court in facie curiae, the contenor may appeal against the punishment imposed.5 9 Prior to this
there was no appeal for criminal contempt convictions, and even now
the discretion of the judge in determining whether such a contempt
has been committed is not questionable.
The period of imprisonment for criminal contempts is normally
for a fixed term set by the judge concerned in his discretion, unless,
of course, the court is proceeding by way of indictment, or other
statutory authority, specifically limiting the penalties applicable. 60
Convictions for contempt when authorized by statute are limited by
the statutory enactment, so that punishments in excess of those
prescribed are illegal. 61 Tendencies toward harsh or excessive sentences hopefully should be counteracted by the appeal provisions of
the Criminal Code. 62
In their use of the summary punishment power against direct
contempts, the courts have imprisoned a witness for refusing to
testify, 63 committed an intoxicated juror," and ordered a barrister
to pay $2,000 or suffer an imprisonment of 60 days for asking in
court without any reasonable explanation that a particular judge not
sit on the appeal about to be heard. 65 In the latter case, the judge
concerned absented himself while his colleagues in the Supreme
Court of Canada heard the appeal. Once the appeal was completed,
however, the judge returned, and the Court summarily and severely
penalized the indiscrete barrister. The Court noted that judges and
courts were open to criticism but that any criticism must be based
on reasonable arguments of law or public policy. In other words, an
55 R. v. Taylor: ex parte Crdpeau, (1965) 50 D.L.R. (2d) 432.
56 E.g., the Judicature Act, the Habeas Corpus Act.
57 Sections 610, 612 the Criminal Code of Canada.
58 Id., section 457.
59 Id., section 9(1).
60 A. G. v. James et al., [1962] 1 All E.R. 255.
61 Lefdbvre v. The Queen, [1966] 1 C.C.C. 89; Quebec Q.B. Appeals; Conviction quashed under Section 457(1) (b) of the Criminal Code since a sentence
of I year was in excess of the stated amount of eight days.
62 Supra note 55.
63 Supra note 51 (for one year).

64 R. v. Rodgers; Be Reynolds, [1952] O.W.N. 492.
65 Supra note 27.
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act calculated to bring a court into contempt, or to lower its authority
66
(in the eyes of the judges), is a contempt and punishable as such.

The courts continuously have warned that the direct contempt
power is to be used "cautiously and sparingly, from a sense of duty
and under the pressure of public necessity and not to vindicate the
judge as a person". 67 "Such arbitrary and unlimited jurisdiction
should be jealously
and carefully watched, and exercised with anxiety
and reluctance." 68
Whatever cautions the courts have voiced concerning the contempt power, it has, oddly enough, been granted by legislative enactment to non-judicial commissioners and boards as an aid to investigation and administrative efficiency. 69 The power has been but rarely
exercised, but the potentiality for its use7 o and abuse continues.
Investigating officers under the Combines Investigation Act are
given ".... all powers that are exercised by any superior court in
Canada for the enforcement of subpoenas ... or punishment of dis-

obedience thereof". 71 In 1929, a certain Mr. Singer was imprisoned
for his refusal to be sworn as a witness and produce certain documents. Even though he subsequently purged his contempt by doing
that which was required of him, his imprisonment continued. It was
held that although Singer was properly committed for contempt, his
continued imprisonment was illegal and that this constituted
an abuse
of the judicial power granted to the Commissioner.72
A recent case73 held that the Ontario Municipal Board has the
power to punish for direct contempts on the basis of the grant to it
by the enabling legislation of the rights and privileges of the Supreme
Court with respect to the attendance and examination of witnesses.7 4
The Board may thus compel witnesses to appear and to answer, and
following a refusal, commit the unwilling witness to prison.
75
One must agree with those who find this somewhat paradoxical
for here the contempt power is freely given to officials who may have
no legal awareness or judicial conscience. The caution and care which
the judiciary have shown in their use of the power obviously does not
appear to have had any effect on the legislatures enacting such
statutes as the Ontario Municipal Board Act. Efficiency in operation
R. v. Gray, [19001 2 Q.B. 36, followed in Re Duncan.
McLeod v. St. Aubyn, [1899] A.C. 549.
Meriden Brittanica Co. Ltd. v. Walter (1915) 34 O.L.R. 518, 520;
following In re Clements (1877) 46 L.J. Ch. 375, at 383.
69 Ontario Municipal Board Act, R.S.O. 1960 c. 274, s. 33, 37; Railways
Act, R.S.C. 1952 c. 234, s. 33(3); Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960
c. 202, s. 277(2)a; Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1960 c. 437, s. 65;
Royal Commissions and Inquiries: supranote 20.
70 Express Traffic Ass'n. v. Montreal, (1919) 25 C.R.C. 61, (attempt to
influence the Railway Board).
71 R.S.C. 1927 c. 26, s. 22.
72 Re Singer (1929) 37 O.W.N. 3.
73 Re Diamond and the O.M.B., [1962] O.R. 328.
74 Section 37, O.M.B. Act, R.S.O. 1960 c. 274.
75 Johnstone, Contempt Power and Legislative Tribunals, (1963) 2
Osgoode Hall L.J. 482.
66
67
68
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is the over-riding concern-"essential" in the view of Mr. Justice
Schroeder of the Ontario Court of Appeal. "... is the power to hold
a recalcitrant witness in contempt and as a means of coercion to
commit him to prision . . . (for otherwise) the administrative machinery of the Board would soon grind to a halt".76 Furthermore,
under section 9 of the Criminal Code, there is no provision for appeal
from contempt convictions by such bodies as the Ontario Municipal
Board. Since by implication this summary contempt power has been
given to all other bodies with similar enabling legislation, legislative
tribunals now possess a contempt power subject to fewer restraints
than the judiciary's contempt power, and therefore even more
arbitrary in the potentiality of its application. It is evident that the
legislators, as well as many judges, do not have a basic understanding
and comprehension of the full implications of this power device.
Civil Contempt of Court
Arising out of equity's coercive methods, the civil contempt
power differs from its brethren in that it usually operates on the
option of the party affected by the disobedience of judgments, writs
or orders (including injunctions) of the Court. It is in this context
that the contempt power can be seen in the form in which it most
directly enforces conformity to law. The power of the Court here is
exercised not as a penalty for contumacious behaviour, but to coerce
a recalcitrant party into obedience.7 7 Even persons not named in a
writ or order of the Court who assist in a breach thereof with
knowledge or notice of such judicial commands, are "guilty" of civil
contempt of court.7 8 Civil contempts have been found within civil
proceedings in such conduct as a failure to comply with a notice
or order for the production and inspection of documents, or a failure
to attend or answer at an examination for discovery. 79 As well, the
disobedience of orders of a more final nature, as for example a
judicial command to give up the possession of certain property, or the
custody of a child,80 have been considered civilly contemptuous.
In general, no one is liable to contempt proceedings and committal for the non-payment of a sum of money (including costs or
charges but not damages)*81 If the indebtedness is for $100 or more,
presently payable, then an arrest of the debtor is permissible where
he is about to quit the jurisdiction (Ontario) in order to defraud his
82
creditors. Such committals are limited to two months in duration
83
and are not open to habeas corpus applications. Furthermore, judg76 Supranote 73 at 331.
77 Supra note 50.
78 See Re Tilco Plastics Ltd. v. Skurjat et a, Attorney-General for
Ontario v. Clark et al, [1966] 2 O.R. 547 where the reputation of an injunction
in the community was held to be sufficient actual notice.
79 Supra note 72.
80 Link v. Thompson, [1917] O.L.R. 227.
81 Fraudulent Debtors Arrest Act, R.S.O. 1960 c. 155, s. 2. Note that
Nova Scotia is the only Canadian jurisdiction that presently allows imprisonment for debt alone.
82 Id.
83 Habeas Corpus Act, R.S.O. 1960 c. 169 Section 1(1).
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ment debtors may be imprisoned for up to one year for refusing to
disclose their assets.8 4 A fraudulent intent has allowed the court to
consider these contents as criminal and thus set its own period of
imprisonment.8 5 An inability to pay if bona fide does act as a good
defence to committal and has been enshrined in various statutes
ordering payments for the support of dependents.8 6 The civil contempt
sanction is thus used as an enforcement device against judgment
debtors who having the means to pay refuse to do so, and therefore
void the execution procedures of the Court.
Parties wishing to enforce a judgment in their favour thus have
imprisonment available as an aid to recovery, even though a fine
might be a more appropriate and just remedy. Unless the court of its
own motion takes notice of the contempt, the party affected brings
it to the attention of the court by a writ attachment or by a motion
to commit. Although attachment was originally used for disobediences
of judgments or orders of the court and committal for breaches of
prohibitory orders, since the Judicature Acts the distinction has
not been of any practical importance.8 7 The remedies are now virtually
interchangeable, even in the course of the proceedings. In one case,
attachment was considered the more appropriate remedy mainly
since it carries with it the right to a writ of sequestration, thus
allowing one to proceed against the property and the person of the
contemnor simultaneously. 88 Because the liberty of an individual is
involved, the courts have required that the specific charge be distinctly stated, that there should be an opportunity to answer the
charge before sentence is passed, 89 that no reasonable doubt remains
of the alleged contemnor's guilt, and that the utmost strictness in
procedure is maintained. 90 However, the procedural protections
afforded 9' the civil contemnor are fewer than the safeguards allowed
the criminal contemnor.
If a definite term of imprisonment is specified by the applicant,
(there being no obligation to do so), or is legislatively prescribed,
then the contemnor is automatically entitled to release at the end of
that term. In order to obtain release in other cases, the contemnor
must apply to the court originating the committal order, and give
notice to all parties concerned. It is only this discharging order, on
the issue of which the court may impose requirements conditional to
84 Rule 594 of the Ontario Rules of Practice; See Charlebois v. Martin,
[19121 4 O.W.N. 412; Hobbs v. Scott (1864) 23 U.C.Q.B. 619.
85 Jones v. MacDonald (1893) 15 Prac. Rep. 345.
86 Deserted Wives' and Children's Maintenance Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 105,
s. 12; Children's Maintenance Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 55, ss. 1, 2; Parent's Maintenance Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 284, ss. 7, 8; Several other statutes have contempt
provisions: notably, The Jurors' Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 199; The Habeas Corpus
Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 169, s. 3; The Criminal Code and its general catch-all
provision: s. 108.
87 R.S.O. 1960, c. 197.
88 Rule 547 and note 80, supra.
89 MacKell v. Ottawa Separate School Trustees (1917) 40 D.L.R. 272.
90 General Printers Ltd. v. Thompson (1964) 46 D.L.R. (2d) 692.

91 See The Coercive Function of CiviZ Contempt, (1965) 33 V. Cmr. L. Rnv.

122, where the civil contempt power is examined in detail.
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release, that clears the contempt. 92 The court is compelled to release
a party entitled to discharge, who neglects to apply for such discharge,
immediately. The contemnor, where the limit of his incarceration is
not fixed, holds "the key to his prison", 93 for once he has complied
with the order of the court previously disobeyed, release is the almost
inevitable outcome. Unless the court has such an interest in the
contempt (due to its possible interference with the judicial process)
as to define the length of punishment, once the contemnor has obeyed
the order of the court, the contempt is purged by the application for
94
and granting of the order of discharge.
The person "guilty" of a civil contempt may appeal the order of
committal, or attack the writ of attachment, or appeal the original
order or judgment of which he is in contempt. The discretionary
nature of a conviction for contempt may make an interference with
the decision by an appellate judge somewhat difficult. This is especially
true in higher courts where no appeal lies from a judgment or order
made in the exercise of the judicial discretion. 95 An appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada must be from a final judgment as defined
statutorily. Therefore, although criminal contempts are appealable
by Section 9 of the Criminal Code, it would appear easier and more
fruitful in the case of civil contempts to appeal the original order or
judgment from which the contempt arose rather than the contempt
conviction itself.
One cannot deny that an act of civil contempt does indicate a
disrespect for the orders of the court, as well as an unwillingness to
give up to one's opponent in litigation what is his by judicial deter.
mination. Although the court is exercising its powers in the execution
of a judgment previously rendered, it is at the same time vindicating
its own authority. The requirement that there be a wilful breach
proven beyond a reasonable doubt 96 is similar to the treatment of
criminal contempts that have always been described as acts of disrespect to the administration of justice. The rationale offered by the
courts to explain the strict treatment of civil contempts is the nature
of the coercive penalty involved-imprisonment. While this is no
doubt a wise course, it does point out that the courts are aware of
the underlying criminal element present in all civil contempts.
Coercion is practically impossible to separate from the punitive aspects
of civil contempt sentences.
The strictness of treatment by the courts of civil contemnors is
somewhat deceptive on closer inspection. Normally, the burden of
proving an affirmative defence is on the defendant. Even though
compliance and inability to comply are complete defences to civil
Twigg v. McCusker (Twigg) [1947] O.W.N. 389.
This expression is found throughout the American cases on contempt
of court.
94 McDonald v. Lancaster Separate School Trustees, (1916) 35 O.L.R. 614.
95 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259.
96 Tilden Rent-A-Car v. Rollins (1966) 57 W.W.R. 309, (Alta. Q.B.), following Savre v. Harris [18793 N.B.R. (C.A.) 681.
92
93
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contempt proceedings, these facts must be proved without the benefit
of ordinary criminal "due process" safeguards-"even though im97
prisonment hinges on the outcome of the determination."
Some civil contempts have been considered so blatant an insult
to the judicial process that they have been treated and punished as
criminal contempts of court. The criminal element had reached the
level where it so coloured the act that its predominate effect was a
violation of a public interest 98 and not just an undercurrent in the
ordinary private consequences of a civil contempt. The courts have
examined the entire case in determining the degree of presence of the
criminal element which if present "will not be condoned lightly", 99
and if pervasive, "will not escape a punitive sentence". 100 The presence
of the criminal civil contempt has allowed the court, and the government in the person of the Attorney-General to commence or continue
criminal contempt proceedings without the agreement of the party
initiating the original civil contempt proceedings, where it is considered that the administration of justice has been detrimentally
affected.' 0 ' The problem lies in knowing at what point a civil contempt
becomes criminal. The courts' treatment of the breach of injunctions,
particularly labour injunctions illustrates the 102
impossibility of making
a sensible civil-criminal distinction in all cases.
To become criminal in character, the breach of an injunction
should (as the courts see it) be of a public nature, that is to say, "a
public depreciation of the authority of the Court that would tend to
bring the administration of justice into scorn". 103 Thus non-compliance
10 4
with an injunction involving, for example, a restraint of trade,
nuisance, 105 trademarks, and copyrights, 06 is predominately a private
unexposed disobedience, and has accordingly resulted in "conviction"
for civil contempt. The focus of the court is thus on the maintenance
of public respect for judicial orders. It appears that private disobediences of court orders made in civil proceedings are not criminal
contempts, even though the identical act, if publicized, suddenly is
considered to be a criminal contempt. What disrespect there is for a
particular law or how it is administered has not been altered. How
the contempt is judicially treated seems to depend on the setting in
which it occurred and its probable influence on the community
at large. 10 7
97
98

Supra note 91 at 122, 125.
Tony Poje et al. v. Attorney-General of B.C., [1953] 1 S.C.R. 527.

99 Buck Stove Co. v. Guelph Foundry Co., (1905) 6 O.L.R. 116.
100 Supranotes 98 and 78 (Poje and Tilco).
101 Supra note 98 at 527.
102 As Fischer has illustrated. Supra note 21.
103 Tilco, supra note 78.
104 Supra note 96.
105 A.G. for B.C. v. Haney Speedways Ltd. (1963) 41 D.L.R. (2d) 85.
106 Dubiner v. Cheerio Toys and Games Ltd., Noel J., Exch., April 1965.

107 See generally, Moskovitz, supra note 24. Poje (supra note 98) is the
extreme case. Criticized by Fischer, (supra note 4) the case resulted in a
criminal contempt conviction from the breach of a civil injunction even
though the parties had reached a settlement subsequent to the grant of the
injunction.
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The conflict between management and labour and the inability
of legislators to find an acceptable answer has produced the most
recent application of the criminal contempt power arising out of civil
proceedings. 0 8 The court has the power to grant an interim or ex
parte injunction for a period of no longer than four days if satisfied
that "a breach of the peace, injury to a person or damage to property
has occurred or an interruption of an essential public service has
occurred or is likely to occur", to any deserving applicant. 109 Employers may then in an ex parte hearing, by proving a prima facie
case, obtain such an injunction limiting the picketing of their business
enterprise by striking employees. Organized labour considers such a
restriction of their right to strike an example of the pro-management
bias of the courts and the property consciousness of the law itself. As
a result, by breaching the injunction (by not stopping picketing when
ordered to do so'n ° by not limiting the number of pickets as ordered,'
by sympathetic picketing or demonstrations equivalent to picketing" 2) and thus necessarily exhibiting a public defiance of the court
order, the persons or unions" 3 involved are liable to convictions for
both civil and criminal contempts of court." 4 Even protest demonstrations against the laws governing labour-management relations,
when carried on at the same time and place where injunctions limiting
picketing are in force have been held to be criminal contempts.1 5 The
courts, when faced with what they consider to be flagrant disrespect
for the judicial process and therefore dangerous and great tendencies
to diminish the authority of the courts in the eyes of the public, feel
obligated to use the contempt power to protect and restore the means
through which justice is available to society. Punishment in such
cases is to deter open defiance of court orders by organized labour,
and as the Court of Appeal of British Columbia recently pointed out,
if obedience is not produced by light sentences, heavier sentences
would be imposed." 6 Unfortunately it appears that what is being
punished in these cases is not a disrespect for the administration of
justice but rather a disrespect for the law itself. The contempt power
is thus being used to enforce obedience to what is considered by many
members of the society, an unjust law. The courts as the law now
stands have really no alternative-the law is the law and whether it
is a just law or not it is to be obeyed.
108 Tilco, supra note 78, and Lenkurt, a very recent decision of the B.C.
Supreme Court.
109 Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 197, s. 17(3). Note that the interim
injunction is also available to labour to be used against management provided the same conditions are present.
110 Upper Lakes Shipping v. Banks (1964) 50 D.L.R. (2d) 734.
111 Tilco, supra note 78.
112 Id.
113 Nissho (Canada) Ltd. v. Int'l. Longshoreman's and Warehouseman's

Union, (1965) 54 W.W.R. 295.
114 Supra note 107, and note 113.
115 Suprt note 78, Tikco.
116 Lenkurt, supra note 108.
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Contempts, Indirect and Criminal:
The Constructive Contempt Power
So far the contempt power has been seen as a means of maintaining order and dignity in judicial proceedings, and of ensuring obedience to legal orders. The courts, however, have also used the contempt
sanction for dealing with indirect contempts abusive of the process
of the court, or detrimental to the administration of justice. These
constructive contempts are in essence, speculative interferences with
the administration of justice brought about by the publication of
allegedly prejudicial comment or opinion.
I

Publicationstending to pervert the impartiality of the judicial
process

Here, the court's central concern is the safe-guarding of the
individual's right to a fair trial. 1 7 Publication of comments, the evident tendency of which is to induce the court to reach a different
conclusion than one based on the evidence properly adduced, is punishable summarily as contempt of court." 8 The use of the summary
contempt power in cases of constructive contempt, it will be recalled,
stems from Rex v. Almon.119 However, even before then the court
was aware of the dangers presented by irresponsible comment. Said
Lord Hardwicke in 1742: "Nothing is more incumbent upon the courts
of justice than to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented, nor is there anything of more pernicious consequence than to
prejudice the minds of the public against persons concerned as parties
20
before the cause is totally heard."'
The conflict between free press and fair trial is of more recent
vintage. The use of the contempt power as the controlling device of
the press has kept pace fairly well with the growth of the press as
a mass media of communication. Canadian courts recognize that publicized comments can at times injuriously affect the course of justice
-that the right to a fair trial encompasses the requirement that the
decision of the court be "founded on the evidence adduced at the trial,
and properly admitted, and the law applicable to the issues, unimpeded
and unprejudiced by any other outside influence".'2' Canada's position
lies closer to the English practice of strictly controlling the press by
way of the contempt sanction than to the American situation where
the constructive contempt power has been "emasculated by statutory
122
and constitutional limitations".
In criminal trials, the prejudice to the accused resulting from
contemptuous publications can take many forms. Both the foreign
publisher and local distributor of a publication containing hearsay
117 Steiner v. Toronto Daily Star [1956] O.R. 14. See generally, Shifren,
The Law of Constructive Contempt (1966) 14 Cmvry's L.J. 281.
118 R. v. Solloway, Ex parte Chalmers, [1936) O.R. 469.
119 Supra,note 9.

120 The St. James Evening Post [1742] 2 Atk. 469 at 469, 26 E.R. 683.
121 R. v. Thomas, Re Globe Printing, [1952] O.R. 22 at 25 (Welles, J.).
122 Freedman, Fair Trial--Freedom of the Press, (1964) 3 OsGooDE HALL
L.J. 52.
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evidence about a pending murder case which would not have been
admissible at trial have been held to be guilty of contempt of court
and liable to fine and imprisonment. 123 Broadcast by radio, as well
as publication in a newspaper, while a case is sub judice, of information that may tend to prejudice potential jurors is an interference
with the course of justice meriting contempt proceedings12 4 Even
mistakenly printing evidence given on a voir dire and later ruled
inadmissible, has resulted in a contempt conviction, although the
absence of knowledge, and lack of wrongful intent were considered
in determining the penalty to be imposed. 125 A biographical study,
published in a magazine of a man charged with murder and awaiting
trial, which included the accused's criminal record, the evidence he
gave at a coroner's inquest, as well as statements and confessions
allegedly made by him, produced contempt convictions for both the
author and the publishing company. 126 The court in that case stressed
that great restraint must be exercised during the pre-trial period,
since those who would constitute the jury are easily affected by such
comments. A newspaper article that stated as fact, that which would
have to be proven in order to find the accused guilty, has been held
to be prejudicial to the fair trial of the accused and a valid instance
for the application of the contempt sanction. 127
Publications prejudicial to a fair trial in civil suits are also punishable by contempt of court, but here the publications must be calculated
to either deter the parties from continuing or defending the action,
or attempt to influence the judge. 128 Discussion or opinion concerning
129 Of
the applicable law in a pending case is considered allowable.
course articles of a factual nature, including accurate statements of
witnesses interviewed, without suggestion as to the anticipated verdict,
have been held not to be 0productive of a prejudicial effect warranting
13
the court's intervention.
That the press does render a great service by reporting to their
readers matters of public importance is recognized by the Canadian
courts. Nevertheless the protection of the individual's right to a fair
trial is necessarily a higher overriding judicial consideration. If the
court concludes that an article is likely to bring about a real and substantial interference with a fair trial, then punishment as a criminal
contempt of court will ensue-an intent on the part
of the publisher
131
or writer to prejudice that fair trial being irrelevant.
The press at the moment must act at its peril when reporting
situations that appear to demand criminal prosecution, for if proceedR. v. Bryan, [1954] O.R. 255.
R. v. Robinson & Co., R. v. Nfld. Broadcasting (1954) 34 M.P.R. 257.
R. v. Hamilton Spectator, [1966] 2 O.R. 503 (C.A.).
Re Editions Macleans and Fulford; R. v. Dion, P.Q., [1965].
Supra note 117.
Vine Products Ltd. v. Green, [1965] W.L.R. 791; Fortin v. Moscarella,
[1957] W.W.R. 81.
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Vine Products, id.
Fortin, supranote 128.

A.G. for Manitoba v. Winnipeg Free Press (1965) 52 W.W.R. 129.
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ings are in fact pending or imminent, then a conviction for contempt
is a strong possibility.132 Even though an innocent, non-negligent,
intent does mitigate the imposition of a fine, or imprisonment, the
use of the contempt power has expanded here to punish persons
attempting to carry out a public service. England was faced with
this same problem until 1960, when by the enactment of the Administration of Justice Act,133 persons publishing articles that tended to
interfere with the course of justice in connection with any proceeding, pending or imminent, would not be considered guilty of contempt
of court, if at the time of publication, they, having taken reasonable
care, did not know, and had no reason to suspect, that the proceedings
were pending or imminent. This limitation of the English contempt
power could reasonably and beneficially be extended to the Canadian
scene.
Whether or not the contempt sanction be used as a deterrent to
interference with the right to a fair trial, when the possibility of
prejudice to that right is present during the trial, it would seem best
for the court to order a new trial. 134 Where constructive contempts
do impinge on the judicial process, the individual affected receives
no relief from the punishment of the contemnor. The damage in such
cases once done usually remains as a more or less permanent blemish
so that it is dubious whether even a new trial would effectively combat
the initial prejudicial impressions produced by the contempt still lurking in the corners of the court room.
Rather than limp along with the contempt sanction and the uncertain remedy if a new trial, it would seem more reasonable, as,
recently suggested, 13 5 to enact restrictive legislation. To judicially expand the contempt power in this instance would be to provide a
discretionary remedy where the lack of discretion by the press is
the very complaint. Definition as a more controllable and predictable
13 6
solution should be acceptable to all concerned. Legislation proposed
confines the press to the publication of only the facts of arrest and
charge, and of any apparent procedural abuses. Coroners' inquests and
preliminary hearings should not be publicized unless it is considered
to be in the public interest by the public officials or judicial officers
concerned. Accurate reports of the trial do no harm, but comments
on the merits of the case should be withheld until the verdict is known.
Once the trial is over, judicial opinion in Canada and England
favours the view that comment is to be freely permitted, 137 although
132
133
144

Supra note 123 and note 231.

1960, Ch. 65, 8 & 9 Eliz. II.
R. v. Dorian, (1953) 10 W.W.R. 379 (Man.); In R. v. MacDonald,
(1939) 4 D.L.R. 377, an order for a new trial was not granted because the
jurors had not read the offending articles. This the court may do, although
it has appeared loath to do so in uncertain conditions. See Shifren, supra
note 117.
135 Supra note 122.
136 Id., at 74, 75.
137 In Re O'Brien, (1899) 16 S.C.R. 197; Glasgow Corp'n. v. Haldervich
& Sons, [1918] S.C. 639.
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contempt of court might still be possible in criminal cases where the
period for appeal has not yet expired.
II

Publicationsscandalizingthe court
To disrespectfully criticize the court or members of the judiciary
is to face the possibility of contempt proceedings of the most arbitrary
nature-"any criticism of the judicial machinery may invoke contempt proceedings". 138 In an early Canadian case it was stressed that,
"vituperation of judges for words spoken by them in discharge of
duty is and always has been deemed a contempt of court punished
summarily by attachment". 1 39 The courts are not bound to take notice
of invective, or imputation of false, corrupt, or dishonest motives and,
from the small number of such cases, it would appear that the courts
have been reluctant to do so.140 The courts, though, have not left all
these matters to public opinion so that the power may hardly be
termed obsolete.' 41 It exists in readiness to be exercised from time
to time when the court considers criticism to be so evidently an impairment of justice that its application is necessitated. 42 Vindication
of a judge is apparently not an acceptable motivation for a proper
use of the power; 143 dignity of the court, rather than of its judicial
officers, being the focus of concern. Nevertheless, the courts have
reasoned that criticism of a judge which has a tendency to lower
his authority diminishes the authority of the court as well. The courts
emphasize that they are not protecting individual judges, (who, like
anyone else, may resort to libel actions) but rather are preventing
an interference with the due course of justice which could result in the
1
public "having (its) confidence in the court, shaken or destroyed". "
Reasonable and temperate criticism of any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good will not be treated as contempt of
court. 45 In the words of Lord Atkin, the freedom of the press to
criticize judicial actions is "no more than the liberty of any member
of the public to criticize temperately and fairly, but freely, any episode in the administration of justice". 146
Intent, or mens rea, has been held irrelevant in cases of constructive contempts that (in the view of the court) scandalize the
court, or diminish its authority, or generally impede the course of
justice. 47 However, libels on the court without a clear intent to bring
the administration of justice into disorder by an incitement to disobey the lawful orders of the court have not been considered in
138 See Fischer, supra note 21 at 159: "As the law stands in Canada..."!
139 R. v. Wilkinson; Be Brown (1877) 41 U.C.Q.B. 47, at 96 per Haines, J.
140

Ziegal, Some Aspects of the Law of Contempt of Court in Canada,

EngZand, and the United States, (1960) 6 McGILL L.J. 229.
141 Id., Ziegal views the contempt power as a hovering judicial right.
142 Id.

McLeod v. St. Aubyn, [1899] A.C. 549, (J.C.P.C. at 566).
Fournier v. A.G. of P.Q., (1910) 17 C.C.C. 108 at 110 (Que. C.A.).
145 Regina v. Grey, [1900] 2 Q.B. 36; Supra note 121; R. v. Buller and
Glazer, (1954) 108 C.C.C. 352 P.Q.
14 Ambard v. A.G. for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] A.C. 322 at 335.
147 R. v. LaRose, [1965] Que. S.C. 18.
143
144
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Canada as seditious. 148 A recent case requires that it should be evident, for a contempt conviction, from a perusal of the entire article
in question, that the writer either attributed improper motives to
members of the judiciary, made false statements, or was maliciously
inspired. 149
One would assume that the regular criminal standard of proof
should apply to constructive contempts, and indeed the courts have
stated that any doubt raised operates to the benefit of the accused. 150
However, the only real evidence available in these cases is that which
establishes the accused as the author of the contempt. Whether the
acts of the so-called contemner have caused a visible corrosion of the
authority of the court is not determinable through a balancing of
probabilities until no reasonable doubt remains of the links in the
causal chain. Here, the only test available or possible to determine
the accused's guilt is for each judge to ask himself: "Would this
act tend to lower the public's respect for me as an individual, and
hence, because of my intimate connection with the court, lower its
esteem in the eyes of the public as well?" The conclusion is unavoidable-in such cases there is no true standard of proof but merely a
subjective, speculative, and possibly arbitrary judicial decision.
Contempts of court have been found in public statements casting
doubt-baseless in the opinion of the court-on the integrity of a
judge who had recently presided over a criminal prosecution which
had resulted in a conviction for murder.' 5 ' Letters of a public nature
which impugned the honesty of the judge while habeas corpus proceedings were pending, led to a conviction of the writer for criminal
contempt. 52 Abusive, vulgar references to certain County Court
judges accusing them of bias, perversion of justice, and breach of
their oaths of office, have been held deserving of severe punishment
as a contempt of court of the worst kind. 153 Accusations, couched in
contemptuous and insulting language, that the court had assumed
dictatorial powers to assist in a campaign for the suppression of the
free press, by warning of the contempt sanction with regard to a
certain pending case, brought contempt convictions 154for both the
owners of the newspaper and the columnists involved.
As long as there is a tendency to lower the dignity of the court
present in the alleged contempt, then a relation in time to any specific
litigation may not be necessary.155 Usually it is obvious to which court
or judge the criticism relates, but even where the connedtion is obscure, the court will not hesitate to use its imagination. An article
Boucher v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 265, and supra note 140.
Supranote 147.
150 Id., and R. v. Sommer [1963] P.Q.C.A. 417.
151 A.G. for P.Q. v. Constantin (1963) 40 C.R. 154.
152 Sommer, supra note 150.
153 R. v. Glanser [1963] 2 O.R. 30.
154 R. v. Western Printing and Publishing Ltd., (1954) 34 M.P.R. 129
(Nfld.).
155 Le Procureur-G~neral de la Province de Quebec v. Dennis, [1966] C.S.
(Que.) 467.
148
149
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in the form of an allegory on capital punishment has aroused a court
(which had recently sentenced a 19-year old boy to death) to impose
the contempt sanction. 156 Eric Nichol's article may have been unfair
to those who had such an unpleasant duty to discharge but it is
difficult to accept the vindication of the process of justice, and the
damage caused to it by Mr. Nichol as the only factors motivating Mr.
Justice Clyne in the ensuing contempt proceedings. Mr. Nichol wrote
in the article creating the furore: "Although I (meaning the public)
did not myself spring the trap that caused my victim to be strangled
in cold blood, I admit that the man who did was in my employ. Also
serving me were twelve people who planned the murder, and the
judge who chose the time and place, and caused the victim to suffer
the exquisite torture of anticipation."'157
The court in moving against Nichol's so-called attempt to lower
its dignity allowed that "fair criticism made in good faith is a legitimate exercise of the freedom of the press which is essential if the
community is to know whether their system of justice is being administered fairly and properly". However, false suggestions made to
the public "that the sentence of the court involves any idea of torture
.. " is not to be tolerated, such suggestions "being contemptuous in
that they carry with them an imputation of improper motives on
the part of the judge who imposed the sentence". 158 Thus it seems
that even the expression of sincere convictions can result in contempt
proceedings even though sufficient grounds for a libel action were not
present.
Evidently the power of contempt has not always been wielded
whenever the court has been confronted with criticism which would
allow its introduction. Only nine reported cases in such circumstances
are to be found between 1877 and 1958 in Canada. 159 Recent cases
though indicate the continuing vitality of the power' 60 and its permanent incorporation into the judicial philosophy. The power is still
considered to be an inherent judicial right applied in the discretion
of the judge or court affected, and only to be disturbed on appeal if
16
grossly abused. '
A heartening decision for advocates of free speech, and an excellent summary of the law on contempt is to be found in a recent
Quebec case involving the celebrated book "J'accuse les assassins de
Coffin". 62 Although the procedural inadequacies of Hdbert's "trial"
were perhaps enough to quash his conviction for contempt, the majority of the court did realistically consider the degree to which
HIbert's book had scandalized the administration of justice. Publica156

R. v. The Vancouver Province, sub nom. Re Nichol, [1954] 3 D.L.R. 690.

157 Id., at 692, but originally appearing as an editorial in the Vancouver
Province, in 1954.
158 Id., at 696.

159 As determined by Ziegal, suranote 140.
160 Id.

161 Supranote 155.

162 Le Procureur General de la Province de Quebec v. Hbert, [19663
B.R. (P.Q. Q.B.) 197.
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tion, after all, had not occurred until some seven years after the
trial and execution of Wilfred Coffin. In balancing the effect on the
process of justice against the benefits of free discussion and comment,
the court decided that "if the scales come down in favour of the
latter, we do not consider that the act complained of should be regarded as contempt at all". 163 The court thus indicated that criticism

casting doubt on the integrity of a judge was not automatically a
contempt of court. There must be as well, the creation of a real
tendency toward the loss of public confidence in the manner in which
justice is being administered, weightier than the advantages to be
derived from free discussion and public debate. In other words, the
court moved a step closer to the position where vindication of the
judicial process by vindication of the judiciary is not called for unless
there is a reasonable and present tendency to foster public disrespect
for the administration of justice without good cause. Perhaps to so
extend the implications of this decision is more wishful thinking
than a valid assessment of probability. Nevertheless, the H6bert case
represents a long-awaited judicial examination of a power device,
perhaps too often used to consolidate and strengthen judicial prestige
than for the benefit of society. Perhaps the court is recognizing that
the real basis of respect for or confidence in the administration of
justice is founded on the ability of the individual judges to adjudicate
justly the matters with which they are faced in court.
We have now examined the areas in which the contempt power
has been applied in order to produce, either directly or eventually,
obedience to law as the courts declare the law to be. In Canada, the
enforcement of civil judgments has not often occurred. 64 The potentiality for abuse is, though, very real, for the power's major limitation
is the judicial conscience. Fortunately, our judges have reacted objectively in most situations.
The nature of the contempt power, its arbitrariness and unrestricted procedures, represents a situation in conflict with the ordinary and expected treatment of individuals charged with any other
act considered detrimental to the good order of society. The restriction of individual liberty in every other case requires procedural safeguards omitted at the pleasure of the judiciary in contempt proceedings. Whether or not the contempt power is an effective means of
inducing or coercing obedience to law, it should first be determined
if it is compatible with the philosophical ideals and bases of obedience
to law and punishment in our society.
The Canadian legal system is conscious of the rights and liberties
of the individual, although, admittedly, it is still more motivated by
the protection of property rights than by ideologies of individuality.
In the normal case, the determination of whether behaviour of a
certain, prohibited kind has occurred is made within a procedural
framework which helps to protect the accused from bias and arbitrary
163

164

Id., at 208, per Casey, .

Supranote 140.
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judgments. In contempt proceedings, because of the contempt power's
inherence in the very foundations of governmental and judicial bodies
(as the cases assume), the individual is considered to have figuratively sacrificed some of his civil liberties to this "essential expedient"
in the adoption of his social contract. Having thus justified the procedural gaps, the courts then proceed to mete out punishment in their
discretion for the contemptuous behaviour with which they are faced.
Punishment in most legal systems is generally viewed as a willed
consequence of behaviour, and so punishment of criminal contempts
(or similar acts under different names) is easily accepted universally.
What is not acceptable outside of the common law world is the use
of punishment to coerce the commission of certain desired acts. AngloAmerican equity in wielding the civil contempt power plainly admits
to acting in personam, while civil law jurisdictions, although realizing that coercion and inducement are connected, refuse to coerce an
individual into acting in a certain way. Punishment, in other words,
should result from the commission of prohibited positive acts. In the
view of the civilians, it is not proper "to jail a man even for a single
day in order to do violence to his incoercible freedom to do or not
to do something". 16 5 Civil lawyers fear governmental arbitrariness
perhaps because civilian judges do not have the independence and
power of their common law brethren. As a result, their philosophical
approach to the relationship between government and people differs
from ours.
It appears, however, that the civilian view of the civil contempt
power more accurately mirrors the Anglo-American theories of individual freedoms and punishment than the practices of the common
law. Not hypocritical in this area, the civil law jurisdictions declare
civil contempt proceedings impossible. As a result, the common law
possesses probably the only sanction in the world which in order to
achieve restoration of the legal order, "counts upon and aims to provoke the co-operation of the defendant". 166
Inconsistency, with ordinary concepts of punishment is indicated
by the very way the magnitude of the coercive penalty in civil contempts is measured-one estimates "the resistance to be overcome
rather than the gravity of what has been done". 16 7 The judge, in
essence, engages in an active struggle with the will of the reluctant
party, an exercise which in many cases may be futile. Beliefs and
attitudes, especially in a sophisticated society, are exceedingly difficult
to "frighten" away so that future deterrence is no logical rationalization for coercive sentencing. Furthermore many of the acts from
which civil contempt proceedings have arisen are incapable of being
changed by reparation, repentence, reformation, or good behaviour.
As a noted authority on the American contempt power has said:
"It takes some straining of reason to include the contempt power
165 Pekelis, Legal Techniques and Political Ideologies: A Comparative

Study (1943) 41 MIcH. L.R. 665 at 674.

16 Id., at 675.
167 GoLDFARB, THE CoNTEMmT POWER, (1963) at 2.
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within the best characteristics of Anglo-American freedom-conscious
law., 168
Civil contempt and the civil law

The French device of the astreinte is often singled out as a possible civilian substitute for the civil contempt power. Defined as "a
pecuniary sanction imposed by the court for every single future
act, or single period of violation of a judicial decision", 169 it can
either result in a single liquidation of damages in futuro, or have a
coercive or comminatory effect. On close examination, however, any
possible similarity with the civil contempt power is fictional. The
decision of a tribunal granted an astreinte neither operates in personam, nor in rem. Nor is the plaintiff able to collect the astreinte
appraised by the court as there is no process of collection to assist
him. Astreinte is thus no more than "a judicial threat resting on a
platonic plane" 170 and but a first step to the finalization of the order.
If non-compliance continues, the plaintiff must return to the tribunal
which reduces the astreinte order to a simple liquidation of damages
without any penal element. Preliminary bluffs apparently do have
some effect in impressing the parties concerned, the astreinte representing the first step to the "final astreinte" which consists of an
anticipatory liquidation of damages, generously calculated, and payable at a specific time.
The evils of judicial arbitrariness are imagined as so diabolic by
civil law systems that even the innocuous astreinte is found only in
France and the Swiss canton of Geneva, and this in the face of the
great influence enjoyed by French law in the civil law world. If the
orders of the courts are being flaunted, these states find a satisfactory solution in streamlining and perfecting their execution procedures so that the co-operation of the recalcitrant party is always
unnecessary for the satisfaction of the judgment awarded to the
injured party. Execution processes are directed against the property
of the defendant, the source from which the judgment award must
eventually come.
The possibility of similar procedures in the common law world
should be considered as a logical, more philosophically acceptable, and
no doubt more efficient alternative. It seems ridiculous to even contemplate imprisoning the uncooperative defendant before making use
of all other modes of execution, honed to the best possible form. Imprisonment, possibly of an indefinite duration, where no recognized
crime has been committed, and arising on the option of an individual
member of society, cannot be consistent with a freedom-conscious legal
system, productive of good order and respect for just law. Civil contempt may aid in the execution of civil judgments but the fact that
168 Id., at 3.

Supra note 165 at 665 and following.
170 Id., at 666.
169
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it collides with our rationales of punishment and does violence to the
trait of individualism should cause its legislative excision. 17'
The summary treatment of contempts of courts

The mode in which contempts of court are handled by the judiciary is the first indication to the casual observer that here indeed is
an exceptional and anomalous area of the law. Contempts are not
dealt with in the ordinary course of the law so that procedural safeguards for the "accused" may be ignored. Summary process in contempt proceedings does not allow the court to absolutely neglect all
rights normally held by the "accused", as recent cases have stressed. 172
This, of course, is with respect to criminal contempts, for in the treatment of civil contempts the courts early decided that even a semblance
of a trial was unnecessary for acts so obviously contemptuous.
Normally; a person being tried for any offence enjoys the following traditional rights and protections: (1) he is accused of a specific
offence; (2) if he pleads not guilty he has the right to a full and fair
trial; (3) the Crown has the burden of proving his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt; (4) he is presumed innocent until proven guilty;
(5)in serious cases, he is entitled to a trial by jury; (6) he has the
right to call witnesses in his defence; and (7) he cannot be compelled
to testify.
In contempt proceedings of a summary nature, the alleged contemnor is called before the court to show cause why he should not
be condemned and punished for contempt of court. In effect, he is
presumed guilty, and carries the burden of proof to show why he
should not be convicted and punished. There is no right to a trial
by jury, nor is there the right to call witnesses on his own behalf.
He may be obliged to testify on the command of the court.
The courts have continually warned that the summary contempt
power be used sparingly and only in cases of urgency. 173 What is
urgent, though, is left to the discretion of the court and not until
the Hdbert case' 74 last year was any attempt made by the judiciary
to limit this great power. Mr. Justice Owen, in that case, stated that
contempts may be dealt with either by summary process or in the
ordinary course of the law, the latter being the rule-the former the
171 See on civil contempt generally-(1965) 33 U. Cm. L. Ray. 120 (supra
note 91) which supports the "abolitionary" view. At 131: "Coercive punish.
ment is only remedial... when the defendant is able to comply." Otherwise
the punishment is punitive, and the contempt therefore criminal. At 132:
"The mere fact that an imprisoned contemnor remains in jail is evidence that
the coercion has not been effective and is grounds for the inference that the
imprisonment may continue to be futile." The comment concludes, at 133, by
saying: "Its (the civil contempt power) utilization without criminal safe.
guards can only be justified if its application is limited to situations in which
it is both effective and necessary to guarantee rights due other parties. Its
use as punishment is unjustifiable and may be unconstitutional. Limiting
coercive imprisonment to its proper role can and should be accomplished
both by legislation and by judicial restraint."
172 Tilco, supr'anote 78; Hdbert, supra note 162.
173
174
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exception.175 It was vigorously affirmed that the summary power
should only be used for emergency situations, as in direct contempt
cases, or where the fairness of the trial would be prejudiced, and that
more definite rules were needed for the guidance of the court.
Indirect contempts have, in general, been treated in a less summary fashion than direct contempts. The only limitation on the defendants in the recent Tilco case1 76 was that they did not have the right
to elect trial by jury. H~bert's conviction was quashed mostly because
he was not allowed at his initial hearing to call witnesses on his own
behalf.
It may be thought that so small a deviation from the regular
methods of trial would not present a great hardship to those individuals concerned. However, any narrowing of the civil liberties of
any member of society could possibly lead to injustices, unfair, arbitrary, or unequal treatment, and as such is only justifiable for reasons
of absolute necessity.
English and Canadian judges have never spent much time attempting to rationalize their use of the summary contempt powerit has long been considered by them an inherent right of the courts.
Even when an explanation is given (as for example, to protect "the
individual right of every citizen to an independent administration of
justice free from influence or intimidation by improper conduct of
any sort."),177 the Anglo-Canadian judiciary tends to view itself as
without capacity of human error or emotion, wielding the contempt
power with perfect discretion, possibly divine sanction, and indubitably divine inspiration. On the other hand, their American brethren,
less nalive in this instance, and unsatisfied with the traditional bases
of justification, have been motivated to seek real reasons for their
use of the summary power. Expedience, the facilitation of the smooth
flow of the trial, the deterrence of misconduct in future cases, and
promotion of the dignity of the court, have all been offered as possible
78
explanations for the departure from normal judicial techniques.
All arguments, it is submitted, logically and naturally become
part of a general plea of necessity. The dangers of complete suppression of the function of justice outweigh the lesser evil of harshness on the part of the judge, say supporters of the power, so that
contempt is championed as a necessary device to achieve order. Necessity by itself, and without substantiation, means little and should always be treated with suspicion. Livingstone, an American authority
on contempt, stated in 1873 that "[iln the present improved state of
the human intellect, people do not so readily submit to the force of
the word necessity as they formerly did. They inquire, they investigate, and in more instances than one the result has been that attributes heretofore deemed necessary for the exercise of legal power were
175

176
177
178

Id., at 218.
Supra note 78.
Bupra note 49.

See GoLDFARB, supranote 167, and Beale, supranote 6.
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found only to be engines of its abuse. Not one of the oppressive prerogatives of which the Crown has been successively stripped in England was defended in its day on the plea of necessity". 7 9 No one can
doubt that the courts do need some means to dispel interference with
the performance of their functions, but there seems to be little reason
to grant them a power greater than even the ordinary right of selfdefence. 80
It is an accepted principle that only society as a whole has the
right to punish offences and that such punishment is to be determined only according to regular and universal principles. Within this
procedural framework, society has placed its beliefs in what constitutes the best atmosphere for the application of justice-that the fair,
just, and equal treatment of all facts alleged to be offences against
society is an essential and contributing factor to the respect that
individuals have for the law and their obedience of the law. Never
is it for the individual wronged or attacked (be he judge or ordinary
citizen) to go beyond self-protection or self-defence and punish the
wrongdoer. Necessity as a rationalization for the use of power, should
therefore end with self-defence. In contempt situations, once the interruption of the court's proceedings has been terminated, only society
as a whole really has the right to determine the punishment merited.
Allegations have been made by the judiciary that the ordinary
process is so slow that by the time punishment in contempt cases
has been arrived at, "the mischief would be done by the due administration of justice being hampered and thwarted".1 81 Procedure by
indictment may have been intolerably slow in the past, but it cannot
be reasonably accepted today as an excuse for the limitation of
individual rights. It is strange for a doctrine to preach that a traitor
or murderer has the benefit of the right to a trial in the ordinary
course of the law, while those in contempt of court do not.182 American
experience, where the courts have been deprived of more and more
of their summary power by the statutory requirement of a jury trial
in certain situations, does not indicate any proportional impairment
of the administration of justice. 83 Procedural shortcomings, even if
(1873) at 264.
Goldfarb's idea; see his conclusions, .supra note 167 at 288ff.
181 Skipworth's Case, (1873) 9 Q.B. 230, per Blackburn, J.
182 See Ziegal, supra note 140.
183 Examples of the American trend include the Morris-LaGuardia Act,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1957. The latter Act prohibits actual or attempted
intimidation which might deprive a person of his right to vote in a federal
election. Government has available to it under this legislation the remedies
of declaratory judgment, and injunction which is enforcable by the power
to punish for contempt. The right to a jury trial under the Act arises when
a contempt has occurred under the Act, of an indirect nature, criminal in the
sense that contempt power is acting as a punishment for the violation of a
voting right, where there has been an initial trial at which a fine in excess
of $300. or a 45 day jail term was imposed. The Act has experienced some
measure of success in allowing federal authorities to protect Negro voting
rights which would have otherwise been restricted by segregationist forces
in southern U.S. communities. The statutory introduction of the right to a
jury trial in certain contempt cases as above defined does though present a
179 LVIiNGSTONE, COMPLETE WORKS
180
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present, should not be an acceptable reason for the removal of substantive rights of such an important and fundamental character.
Against any rationalizations of the summary power developed by
the courts stands the repugnancy of the powers to all the basic principles of criminal law and justice. In many cases the nature of the
act constituting a contempt is an ad hoe finding of the court. As well
as defining the behaviour criminally contemptuous, the court is thus
in fact legislating unto itself the power to punish such acts by imprisonment, outside of ordinary procedures and without the option
of a jury trial. It is suggested that this assumption of the administration of criminal law is a constitutionally unacceptable practice that
84
should be considered as intolerable by the responsible legislator.
Deification of the judiciary
The danger, exceedingly obvious, of allowing the judge offended
to play the role of injured party, prosecutor, and judge-a combination of power which even "the highest executive head of the state
does not possess", 185 has not been recognized to any great degree by
the Canadian courts. To maintain that judges possess super-human
capacities of patience and objectivity is to naively ignore the questionable applications of the contempt power seen previously. Some
commentators have cynically viewed the power's longevity as directly
due to the fact that judges are human and therefore are subject to
the "natural inclination of men to extend their power". 186 Judges
problem since it is legend that southern juries will not convict segregationists
charged with civil rights violations. The expansion of a civil liberty thus in
this area may result in the hampering of civil rights. The very strength of
the jury system, the incorporation of the sense and values of the community,
has the potentiality here for establishing a double standard of law and justice
in this instance depriving a whole body of citizens of their constitutional
rights. See: Civil Rights v. Civil Liberties: The Jury Trial Issue, (1965) 12

U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 48. The highpoint of the jury trial issue came with the
Barnett case. See U.S. v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964) from 336 F. 2d 369
(5th Cir) 1963. As will no doubt be remembered, Governor Barnett of Mississippi actively defied and interfered with a court order allowing the registration of Negro student James Meredith at the University of Mississippi. In a
divided decision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that as a
matter of right that Barnett was not entitled to a trial by jury. However
several of the judges expressed the opinion that the American Constitution
forbids a trial without a jury except when the sentence was not severe. It
would appear from this that the limit of severity was the penalty provided
for petty offences of six months. Mr. Justice Goldberg dissented in that the
character of the wrong should be examined in each case and if the wrong
was in fact a separate crime, then and only then would the defendant be
legally entitled to a jury trial. Thus the summary contempt power was
narrowed in scope, the trend continuing in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in
which Congress granted jury trials in all cases arising under the Act. Use
of the jury in Canadian contempt cases, although idealistically a wise solution
to the problem of judicial arbitrariness, does not appear to be presently
accepted by the judiciary. The right to a jury trial should be a right of every
person accused of a serious contempt.
184 See Fischer, supra note 21 at 155 for the Canadian constitutional
context.
185 TK
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(1949) 2nd ed., 74.
186 Supra note 12 at 273.
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being human, are subject to anger like any other men and when they
87
are angry, they, like any other men, desire no limit to their power."'
A recent Canadian case noted that while it was preferable for
a judge, other than the one faced with the contempt to try the matter,
the latter did have jurisdiction and was seized of the matter unless
he passed it on to another judge. 188 This would appear to indicate
judicial awareness of the problem. Never, however, has our judiciary
indulged in the self-analysis and criticism found in the decisions of
the American bench. American judges have been much more aware
of their own human inadequacies, attempting in many cases to confine the contempt power to "the least possible power adequate to the
end proposed". 189 One must agree that "it transcends recognized
frailities of human nature to suppose that a judge can be free from
natural pique which would be engendered by a direct refusal by the
accused to obey an order freshly made by him, and the temptation
to strike back which inevitably accompanies ruffled pride. 1 90 Alternatively the danger to such an arbitrary treatment is in the possible
leniency of a judge where harsher punishment would be in the best
interests of society and the judicial process. 191
The judiciary asserts that through contempt proceedings, it upholds the respect of society for the judicial process. In reality, though,
is not the view that "respect and obedience are not engendered by
arbitrary and automatic procedures, that in the end such procedures
yield only contempt to the courts and the law", 192 a better analysis?
Moral rightness is a better foundation for respect than artificial might.
Although acts of contempt do tend to indicate a disrespect for the
judicial process, the behaviour concerned may be based on a broader
social discontent, superficially a disrespect for a law but in fact a
craving for justice. 193 The law is not considered to be a just law by
these persons in contempt, and the acts of contempt indicate their
disapproval and dissatisfaction. Arbitrary (if only in appearance) and
summary treatment in such cases does little to create an atmosphere
for rational, unemotional discussion of the social inequities involved.
The very application of the contempt power appears as an unjust way
of treating the breach of what may be an unjust law.
187 Beale, sup'ranote 6 at 172.

188 Sommer, supra note 150.

189 First stated in Anderson v. Dunn, (1821) 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204 at 231.
190 Ballantyne v. U.S., (1956) 237 F. 2d. 657 at 669, Cameron J. (5th Cir.).
191 See Fox, Eccentricities of the Law of Contempt of Court, (1920) 36
L.Q. REv. 394: "The existence of arbitrary power in a judge may cause him
to abstain from exercising it... when punishment is necessary. In any case,
it seems desirable to fix a statutory limit to the period of imprisonment and
to the amount of the fine in cases of contempt, especially if it can be shown
that the present practice is the result of encroachment on the rules of the
common law."
192 Green v. U.S., (1958) 356 U.S. 165 at 218, Black, J., dissenting.
193 See report on the address by J. C. McRuer, then Chief Justice of the
High Court of Ontario, present head of the Ontario Law Reform Commission,
to the American Bar Association meeting in Montreal, August of 1966, in
SATURDAY NIGHT,

October, 1966.
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It is not proposed that the justifications for civil disobedience
be enumerated but where such acts lead to contempt proceedings, the
manner of their judicial treatment tends to add the force of judicial
vindication to the normal punishment resultant from interference
with an interest considered beneficial to the society. Respect for law
or the judicial process is in particular not aided by the use of the
contempt power to limit criticism that is considered unreasonable or
malicious by the judiciary. 94 All members of society have the protection of the laws of libel and slander. Why should judges, where
criticism does not actually interfere with trial proceedings, need
more? The Canadian attitude, perhaps reflecting Qur conservative
traditions, contrasts remarkably with the freewheeling American position. We have a fear of weakening the judicial fortress, so great that
our freedom of speech is a limited right.
A recent criticism of a judge because of his obvious leniency in
dealing with an accident-prone hit-and-run driver resulted in disciplinary action, similar to contempt proceedings, by the Quebec Bar Association. The Superior Court of Quebec quashed the action because the
person making the criticism was not speaking either as an individual
or a lawyer, but in his position as the Minister of Justice. 195 To
describe, as Mr. Wagner did, the judge's treatment of the case as a
"serious lapse of professional ethics" should be the right of every
individual interested in the fair and proper application of law for
the betterment of society whether the assessment made is valid or not.
Our judiciary would hardly turn the other cheek if confronted
with the opposition and criticism such as the "Impeach Warren"
signs prominently displayed on U.S. highways faced and ignored by
Supreme Court judges in the United States. Although some commentators presently see the general attitude of our judges as finding
contempts only where the action is directed against the judge as an
officer of the court rather than as a person, 196 we are far from being
able publically to speak our mind. Much more to be desired in this
area is the American view of free speech as expressed by Mr. Justice
Black: "The assumption that respect can be won by shielding judges
from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American
public opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak one's
mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the
name of preserving the dignity of the bench would probably engender
194 See Fischer, supra note 21 at 161. Fischer concludes "that the suppression of constructive criticism itself constitutes an interference with the
due administration of justice." He cites Laski, Procedure for Constructive
Contempt in EngZand, (1928) 41 Hav. L. Rav. 1031 at 1031, 1033: "It is ...
one thing to make a judge secure; it is another thing to protect him from
just comment by the citizen-body.., to secure for the public the certainty
that this criticism will be made is therefore important .... Yet no such protection is afforded... in English law."
195 Decision of the Superior Court of Quebec, December, 1966.
196
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resentment, suspicion,
and contempt much more than it would en1 97
hance respect."
The learned and respected Mr. Justice Frankfurter strongly
agreed that because judges are fallible beings, a "vigorous stream of
criticism expressed with candour however blunt"'198 is needed to
ensure that those entrusted with great power and responsibilities do
not abuse their privileged position. Criticism of the judicial process
after a particular case is finished, whether "uninformed or irresponsible or misrepresentative, is part of the precious right of the free
play of opinion (and) whatever violence there may be to truth in
1 99
such utterances must be left to the correction of truth".
Conclusions:Does the contempt power as an enforcement device result
in obedience to law?
From a survey of the cases and writings on contempt of court,
the conclusion has been reached that in the long run obedience to
law is not well served by the contempt power.
Direct contempt proceedings do aid in maintaining the proper
atmosphere for judicial determinations. Constructive contempt proceedings provide a necessary control and penalty for acts interfering
with the individual's right to a fair trial. These applications do much
to set and maintain the stage for trials in the ordinary course of the
law and the attendant rights and procedures that ensure that justice
is done. To have these interferences treated, however, in any way
other than the normal, detracts from and confuses the view that
society must have of the judicial process in order to have respect
both for it and the law. Equality and fairness of treatment are
essential in order to have, and foster, obedience to law from all
members of society.
The civil contempt power is directed to the immediate obedience
of law and judicial commands, yet it is inconsistent with our concepts
of punishment. The restriction of criticism of the administration of
justice appears so dangerous as to cancel any possible beneficial effects.
All contempts are examples of unlimited and arbitrary powers
which perhaps through the lack of legislative initiative remain as
historical accidents and anomalies, inconsistent and incompatible
with individual civil liberties and rights and a legal system aware
that obedience to law is better motivated than enforced.
To continue the contempt power in its present form is to continue
the restriction of basic rights and liberties, the attempts to coerce
the uncoercible, the maintenance of respect for the judicial process
by the stifling of our freedom of speech without regard to the fact
197 Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, (1942) 86 L. Ed. 192 at 207,
Black, J.
198 Craig v. Harney, (1946) 91 L. Ed. 1546 at 1558 per Frankfurter, J.
199
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that "it is man's recognition of the objective truths and values in
law which mainly impose the obligation to obey the law".200
Some control is needed, but in the determination of the type
of method and the way it is to be used, we must keep in mind the
words of John Stuart Mill: "A state which dwarfs its men, in order
that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for
beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great things
can really be accomplished."
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM:
Acts constituting contempt of court must be dealt with so that
individual rights and liberties are not arbitrarily removed and the
administration of justice is not hampered in its essential duty to
society of seeking justice for every case with which it comes in
201
contact.
All powers of contempt presently available to courts, administrative bodies and legislatures should be abolished.
A precise criminal offence of contempt should be legislatively
enacted with prescribed penalties and areas of application. This
offence would operate where all methods of civil execution have failed
or where there has been a positive interference with the judicial
process or government. Offences of this category would without fail
be tried in the ordinary course of the law.
Civil contempts as presently known and treated would cease to
exist. The improvement and streamlining of execution procedures
for civil judgments would be encouraged and legislatively assisted.
Refusal to testify (after warning and expulsion from the court)
as well as the breach of labour injunctions, would probably be considered as ordinary criminal offences.
Interferences tending to alter a fair trial would be dealt with as
criminal offences defined under detailed legislation.
Criticism of the judicial process or the judiciary would not be
subject to limitation other than the right of a judge, as any other
citizen, freely to sue, if necessary and warranted, for libel or slander.
Admittedly, the dangers possible under the present unlimited
power are more potential than actual. Nevertheless, if only for the
200 Quoted by Lechtrek, Chafee on Law and Freedom of Speech, (1965)
2 CATHOLIC LAWYER, from Chafee's article: Do Judges Make or Discover Law?
(1949) 91 Am. PRM. Soc. PRO. 91 at 406.
201 See Fischer, supra note 21 at 162. He feels that the contempt "problem" has resulted from the application of the old contempt concepts to new
social developments. The alternative, in his view, must be a reformation of
the contempt concept by the legislative branch of government upon the
making of an aware value judgment while cognizant of all the interests to
be protected.

Courts sometimes consider that their "inherent" power cannot be restricted by statute. See Civil Contempt, supra note 91 at 133. Since Parliament
is supreme as a law-maker, this view seems questionable.
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sake of honesty and consistency, the contempt power should be removed from the hands of our judiciary,
despite the fact that they
2
have on the whole so far served us well.20
202 See GOLDFARB, generally.

